proposed a hypothesis of timing in rats to account for the results of experiments that have used the peak procedure with gaps. According to this hypothesis, the introduction of a gap causes the animal's memory for the pregap interval to passively decay (subjectively shorten) in direct proportion to the duration and salience of the gap. Thus, animals should pause with short, nonsalient gaps but should reset their clock with longer, salient gaps. The present authors suggest that the ambiguity of the gap (i.e., the similarity between the gap and the intertrial interval in both appearance and relative duration) causes the animal to actively reset the clock and prevents adequate assessments of the fate of timed intervals prior to the gap. Furthermore, when the intertrial interval is discriminable from the gap, the evidence suggests that timed intervals prior to the gap are not lost but are retained in memory.
The peak procedure has been an important tool in the assessment of the ability of animals to time intervals. The peak procedure involves first training an animal with a fixed-interval schedule of reinforcement in which the first response after a fixed duration, say 30 s, results in reinforcement; the animal is then tested with longer probe intervals that end without reinforcement to assess the distribution (and, in particular, the peak level) of responding. Data collected using this procedure have been useful in the development of models of timing that posit an internal clock (e.g., S. Roberts & Church, 1978) .
One means of testing the predictions of theories of timing is to examine what an animal does when there is a gap or break in the stimulus to be timed. Three hypotheses are (a) the clock continues to time through the gap, (b) the clock pauses and retains the portion of the interval already timed and then restarts at the end of the gap, and (c) the clock resets and starts from 0 at the end of the gap. To test these hypotheses, one should determine where the peak in responding occurs without a gap and then ask how far the peak is shifted on trials with the gap. If the clock has timed through the gap, then the peak should not shift. If the clock has paused, then the peak should shift an amount equal to the duration of the gap. Finally, if the clock has reset, then the peak should shift an amount equal to the duration of the pregap interval plus the duration of the gap. The general finding has been that rats tend to pause during a gap (Church, 1978; S. Roberts, 1981) but pigeons tend to reset their clocks (Cabeza de Vaca, Brown, & Hemmes, 1994; W. A. Roberts, Cheng, & Cohen, 1989) .
Recently, however, it has been suggested that in both species, the effect of the gap on the internal clock may depend on the relative salience of the gap or the contrast between the to-be-timed signal and the gap (Buhusi, 2003; Buhusi, Perera, & Meck, 2005; Buhusi, Sasaki, & Meck, 2002) . According to Buhusi et al. (2005) , memory for the accumulated time prior to the gap decays during the gap at a rate proportional to the perceived salience of the gap. As the gap is often a period of time in the absence of the to-be-timed stimulus (e.g., darkness or the absence of an auditory stimulus), curiously, the rate of decay of the memory for the duration of the pregap stimulus is hypothesized to be directly proportional to its salience (which in turn is directly proportional to the salience of the gap). That is, according to this salience hypothesis, the more intense the stimulus to be timed, the more salient the gap should be and thus the faster memory for the duration of the stimulus should decay. Finally, Buhusi et al. (2005) proposed that when the pregap duration decays, it does not simply become less detectable or more error prone, but it systematically decreases in duration (i.e., it becomes subjectively shorter; see also Spetch & Wilkie, 1983 , but cf. Church, 1980 . Thus, this hypothesis proposes that the longer the gap, the shorter the remembered duration of the pregap interval.
In support of the salience hypothesis, Buhusi et al. (2005) showed that pigmented rats, which are better able to discriminate visual stimuli than albino rats are, appeared to reset their internal clock when the timed interval was signaled by high-but not low-intensity visual stimuli. However, both strains of rat appeared to reset their internal clock when salient auditory stimuli were used. Similarly, pigeons tended to reset their internal clock when the gap represented a large decrease in visual stimulus intensity but to pause their clock and retain the interval timed when the gap represented only a moderate decrease in visual stimulus intensity .
We proposed elsewhere (Sherburne, Zentall, & Kaiser, 1998 ) that many of the effects that have been reported when memory for temporal intervals has been assessed may not be produced by the decay or subjective shortening of a to-be-remembered interval but rather by the ambiguity produced by the similarity of the gap (or delay) to the time between trials (the intertrial interval)-what we have called the ambiguity hypothesis. Thus, to the extent that a novel event such as a gap appears similar to the intertrial interval, the animal will tend to reset its clock (as it learned to do during the intertrial interval in training). To the extent that the novel event does not appear similar to the intertrial interval, the animal will tend to pause.
The focus of the Sherburne et al. (1998) article was primarily on delayed conditional interval discriminations (see, e.g., Spetch & Wilkie, 1983 ), so we first consider that context before applying the ambiguity hypothesis to data collected using the peak procedure with gaps. Spetch and Wilkie had trained pigeons in a conditional interval discrimination in which the birds had learned to choose one comparison stimulus after the presentation of a short (2-s) signal and the other comparison stimulus after the presentation of a longer (10-s) signal. They then tested the pigeons by inserting into the trial (between the offset of the timed signal and the onset of the comparison stimuli) a delay that varied in duration from trial to trial. The resulting divergent retention functions (choice accuracy as a function of delay) were consistent with an interval decay or subjective shortening account. Memory for the short interval remained high, whereas memory for the longer interval declined rapidly to a point well below chance (50% correct). Spetch and Wilkie reasoned that the pigeons' memory for the intervals subjectively shortened with time such that when the delays were sufficiently long, the long interval actually was remembered as being more similar in duration to the original short interval than to the original long interval.
We argued, however, that the similarity between the delay and the intertrial interval may have caused the pigeons to judge the relatively novel delay trials to be trials without an initial signal (especially when the delay was relatively long), and the absence of a signal would likely be judged to be more similar to the short duration than to the long duration (Sherburne et al., 1998) . To test this hypothesis, we trained pigeons on a conditional interval discrimination (2 s vs. 10 s) with either a lit or a dark intertrial interval. The pigeons were then tested with delays of variable duration that were lit on some trials and were dark on others. The results were consistent with the ambiguity hypothesis. When the illumination during the delay was the same as the illumination during the intertrial interval experienced during training (both lit or both dark), divergent retention functions were found. However, when the illumination during the delay was different from the illumination during the intertrial interval experienced during training, the retention functions were parallel. Thus, when the potential ambiguity between the delay and the intertrial interval was reduced, divergent retention functions (suggestive to some of subjective shortening) were no longer found. Similar results have been reported by Zentall, Klein, and Singer (2004) .
Although it may not be obvious, the results that have been obtained with the peak procedure when gaps are introduced also may be amenable to an ambiguity interpretation. To better appreciate the decision process that the animal experiences on trials with a gap, it is helpful to examine how the animal learns when it is appropriate to (actively) reset its clock. On fixed-interval trials, the animal probably learns to reset its clock with reinforcement or with the intertrial interval. When nonreinforced probe trials are introduced, the intertrial interval still serves as a cue to reset the clock, but which aspect of the intertrial interval serves that purpose is likely to depend on the salience of the to-be-timed signal. If the to-be-timed signal is salient, then the start of the intertrial interval is likely to be distinctive and the stimulus change that occurs when the signal ends is likely to reset the clock. However, if the to-betimed signal is not salient, then an interval of time in the absence of the signal is more likely to serve as a cue to reset the clock.
On trials in which a gap (an event that results in a stimulus change similar to that of the intertrial interval) is introduced, the animal should reset its clock as it learned to do during training. When the to-be-timed signal is salient, the stimulus change should be sufficient to reset the clock; however, when the to-be-timed signal is not salient, the animal may rely more on how long the signal has been off. Initially, the novelty of signal offset early in the trial should cause the animal to pause but, as the duration of the gap increases, the animal may judge the gap to be the start of an intertrial interval and the clock will be reset.
Although Buhusi et al. (2005) suggested that the ambiguity hypothesis as proposed by Kaiser, Zentall, and Neiman (2002) cannot account for their rat data, we propose that this relatively simple model can account for virtually all of the data that have been reported using the gap procedure. Consider first the results of two studies that manipulated the similarity between the intertrial interval and the gap. First, when the gap and the intertrial interval are similar (i.e., they were both lit or were both dark), Kaiser et al. (2002) found that pigeons tended to reset their clock. When the intertrial interval was distinctively different from the gap (i.e., one was lit and the other was dark), however, the pigeons paused. Similarly, in a study with rats, Buhusi and Meck (2002, Experiment 2) found that when the intertrial interval and the gap were similar, the rats tended to reset; however, when a distinctive noise was presented during the intertrial interval but not during the gap, the rats clearly paused.
Other results reported with rats can also be accounted for by the ambiguity hypothesis. For example, S. Roberts (1981) reported that albino rats paused with gaps that were similar to the intertrial intervals. However, Roberts's to-be-timed signals (visual for some rats, auditory for others) were not very salient, so the start of the intertrial interval was not distinctive and the short gap was not likely to reset the clock. Similarly, Buhusi et al. (2005) reported that albino rats paused with visual signals, but with auditory signals 3-10 dB louder than those used by Roberts, the rats tended to reset the clock. Buhusi et al. also reported that when visual signals were used, pigmented rats, which are more visually sensitive than albinos, tended to reset the clock, but only when the gap was relatively long and the visual signal was relatively bright.
Pigeons too appear to be sensitive to the salience of the to-betimed signal, but only when the gap can be confused with the intertrial interval. If the gap is similar to the intertrial interval and the to-be-timed signal consists of a low-salience dim screen , Experiment 1), pigeons tend to pause when a gap is introduced. When the visual stimulus is more salient, however, the pigeons tend to reset (Buhusi et al., 2002, Experiment 1; Kaiser et al., 2002) .
Another variable that appears to affect whether the clock pauses or resets is the duration of the gap. When the stimulus conditions during the gap and the intertrial interval are similar, the longer the gap, the more like the intertrial interval it appears, and thus the more likely the animal is to reset (Buhusi et al., 2005 , Experiment 1 with pigmented rats and Experiment 3; Cabeza de Vaca et al., 1994; W. A. Roberts et al., 1989, Experiment 3) . In several experiments, when the gap was short, shifts in peak responding were found that were intermediate between pause and reset. As noted earlier, to account for these results, Buhusi et al. (2005) suggested that a passive decay mechanism subjectively shortens the pregap interval. According to this hypothesis, a 5-s gap may shorten a 15-s pregap interval to 0 s (see Buhusi et al., 2005, Figure  5 )-a remarkable timing error. Alternatively, we propose that if the meaning of the gap is ambiguous and the onset of the gap is not salient, animals may initially pause, but with longer gaps that are more likely to be confused with the intertrial interval, they are likely to reset.
The apparent difference in results obtained from pigeons and rats (especially albino rats) can be attributed to differences in their reliance on visual versus temporal cues. Pigeons' response behavior is controlled primarily by the visual similarity between the retention interval or gap and the intertrial interval, whereas albino rats are also controlled by the temporal similarity of the retention interval or gap and the intertrial interval. In that regard, it is interesting to note that whereas pigeons typically show a chooseshort effect when retention intervals are introduced in a conditional interval discrimination (produced, we suggest, by ambiguity between the appearance of the retention interval and the intertrial interval), rats do not appear to show such an effect (Church, 1980) . Instead, rats show no bias, at least not until the retention interval approaches the duration of the intertrial interval: At that point, they do show the typical choose-short effect.
The salience hypothesis and the ambiguity hypothesis represent two different levels of analysis. According to the salience hypothesis, memory for the duration of the gap decays automatically (passively) and the rate of decay depends on the salience of the gap. According to the ambiguity hypothesis, one cannot tell whether memory for the duration of the gap decays automatically because when the gap and the intertrial interval are similar and the to-be-timed signal (and thus the gap) is salient, the animal actively resets. When the to-be-timed signal is less salient, the duration of the gap may also exert some control over resetting because the animal may not reset immediately. Thus, although it is possible that both hypotheses are correct, what evidence exists suggests little support for the automatic decay process predicted by the salience hypothesis. When the intertrial interval was differentiated from both the to-be-timed signal and the gap, little evidence was found for resetting in rats (Buhusi & Meck, 2002, Experiment 2) or pigeons (Kaiser et al., 2002; Zentall et al., 2004) . Furthermore, in a conditional interval discrimination (duration sample matching to sample), little evidence for such a decay process (subjective shortening) was found when the intertrial interval was differentiated from the delay (Sherburne et al., 1998) .
We propose that within the parameters of signal duration, gap placement, and gap duration studied, when ambiguity is removed, insertion of a gap results in little loss of memory for the duration of the pregap signal. However, whether or not the ambiguity hypothesis can account for all of the data obtained using the peak procedure with gaps and delayed conditional interval discriminations, we suggest that better models of timing can be developed if one avoids the ambiguity (or instructional uncertainty) that may come from using a gap that is either similar to the intertrial interval or insufficiently distinct from the to-be-timed signal.
